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ROMBACH V. CHANG : TO 9(b) OR NOT TO 9(b)
SCOTT D. WOLLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Rombach v. Chang,1 the Second Circuit held that the height-
ened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b)2 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure applies to claims brought under section 113 and
section 12(a)(2)4 of the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”)
when the claim “sounds in fraud.”5  Although this was an issue of
first impression for the Second Circuit,6 several district courts
within the Second Circuit had split on the issue.7  In addition, the
decision was consistent with several other circuits that have held
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Johnnie B. Rawlinson, United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  J.D. New York Law School, 2004; B.S. University of Mary-
land, 2000.  The author is grateful to the editors of the New York Law School Law Review
for their advice and meticulous work on this case comment.
1. 355 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2004).
2. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).  The rule states, in pertinent part, that in “all averments of
fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with
particularity.” Id.  The Second Circuit has interpreted this to require a plaintiff alleging
a securities law violation based on a false or misleading statement to “(1) specify the
statements that the plaintiff contends were fraudulent, (2) identify the speaker, (3)
state where and when the statements were made, and (4) explain why the statements
were fraudulent.”  Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1175 (2d Cir. 1993).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1998).  Section 11 imposes civil liability against an issuer of
securities and those classes of persons named in the statute. Id.  Liability under Section
11 arises if a registration statement filed with the SEC, at the time the registration state-
ment becomes effective, “contained an untrue statement of material fact or omitted to
state a material fact . . . necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.” Id.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2000).  Section 12(a)(2) imposes civil liability on any-
one who sells a security pursuant to a prospectus or any other communication that is
false or misleading. Id.
5. Rombach, 355 F.3d at 167.
6. Id.
7. See Griffin v. PaineWebber Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 508, 513-14; In re Ultrafem Inc.
Sec. Litig., 91 F. Supp. 2d 678, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that rule 9(b) applies to
section 11 and section 12(a)(2) claims “where the complaint is grounded in fraud”);
Ellison v. Am. Image Motor Co., 36 F. Supp. 2d 628, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that
rule 9(b) applies); In re In Store Advertising Sec. Litig., 878 F. Supp. 645, 647-49
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding rule 9(b) inapplicable); Nelson v. Paramount Communica-
tions Inc., 872 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding rule 9(b) inapplicable).
809
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that the heightened pleading requirements of rule 9(b) are applica-
ble to section 11 and section 12(a)(2) claims.8  Those courts, as the
Second Circuit did here, distinguished between allegations that
sound in fraud rather than in negligence.9
This case comment will argue that the heightened pleading re-
quirements of rule 9(b) should not apply to claims under section
11 of the Securities Act, whether or not those claims were grounded
in fraud.  Requiring the heightened standard of rule 9(b) under-
mines the purpose of the Securities Act and is inconsistent with the
plain language of section 11.  In addition, there is already ample
protection for defendants from claims under section 11 of the Se-
curities Act so that the protections of rule 9(b) are not necessary.
II. BACKGROUND
In Rombach, the plaintiffs were a class of investors that pur-
chased stock in Family Golf Centers, Inc. (“Family Golf”) between
May 1998 and August 1999 and a subclass that purchased Family
Golf stock in the secondary public offering.10  Family Golf, a pub-
licly traded company, was a leading consolidator of golf centers.11
In 1998, the company adopted a growth strategy of acquiring large
golf course operators with multiple locations.12  That same year,
Family Golf made three such acquisitions.13  To help finance these
transactions, the company conducted a secondary public offering
of securities on July 23, 1999.14  During these three transactions,
Family Golf and its underwriters made several optimistic public
8. See Shapiro v. UJB Financial Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 288 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding
that “when § 11 and § 12(a)(2) claims are grounded in fraud rather than negligence,
Rule 9(b) applies”); Melder v. Morris, 27 F.3d 1097, 1100 n.6 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding
that rule 9(b) applies when “Securities Act claims are grounded in fraud rather than
negligence”); In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The
particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) apply to claims brought under Section 11 when,
as here, they are grounded in fraud.”); Sears v. Likens, 912 F.2d 889, 893 (7th Cir.
1990) (holding that the plaintiff’s Securities Act claims sounded in fraud and did not
satisfy rule 9(b)).
9. Id.
10. Rombach, 355 F.3d at 167.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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statements that claimed success in the integration of the newly ac-
quired securities.15
In early 1999, Family Golf announced lower than expected
earnings for the last quarter of 1998, and the stock price soon fell
by more than 43%.16  In August of 1999, the Company announced
another loss for the second quarter of the year and that it was in
default on a number of financial obligations.17  On May 4, 2000,
Family Golf filed for bankruptcy protection.18
The plaintiffs brought suit, filing their original complaint on
February 16, 2000, and a consolidated amended class action com-
plaint was filed on July 17, 2000.19  Named as defendants were: Do-
minic Chang, chief executive officer and chairman of Family Golf;
Krishnan Thampi, president, chief operating officer, assistant secre-
tary, treasurer and director; and Jeffrey Key, chief financial officer
(the “individual defendants”).20  Also named were Jefferies & Co.,
Inc. and Prudential Securities, Inc., the underwriters of the 1998
secondary public offering (together, the “underwriters”).21  The
complaint alleged that the individual defendants and the under-
writers made several misrepresentations and omissions about the
Company’s financial condition, especially that the newly acquired
golf facilities would be profitable even though the defendants knew,
or should have known, that the Company was in a liquidity crisis
and having serious trouble integrating the new acquisitions.22
The complaint set forth five claims, two of which are relevant
here.23  First, the plaintiffs alleged that all defendants violated sec-
tion 11 of the Securities Act by disseminating a registration state-
ment containing false and misleading statements and omitting
15. Rombach, 355 F.3d at 167-68.  For example, Family Golf issued “press releases
indicating that the integration of the new acquisitions was progressing smoothly.” Id. at
168.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 167-68.
20. Rombach, 355 F.3d at 167.
21. Id. at 167.  Family Golf was originally named as a defendant but was dropped
after it filed for bankruptcy protection. Id. at 168 n.1.
22. Id. at  168.
23. Id.  The plaintiffs also brought claims under section 15 of the Securities Act,
section 10(b) and rule 10(b)(5) of the Exchange Act of 1934, and section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act of 1934.
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material facts.24  Second, the complaint stated that the underwriters
violated section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act by soliciting the sale
of shares in the secondary public offering based on a prospectus
that contained false and misleading statements and failed to state
material facts.25  All the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint
for, among other grounds, failure to plead fraud with sufficient par-
ticularity under rule 9(b).26
As to the section 11 claims against the Individual Defendants,
the district court found them to be “classic fraud allegations.”27
The “fraud” language in the complaint identified by the district
court alleged dissemination of an “inaccurate and misleading” re-
gistration statement and that the registration statement “contained
false statements of material fact and omitted other facts necessary
to make the statements not misleading.”28  Furthermore, the plain-
tiffs were found to have “relied on these statements to their detri-
ment.”29  Thus, because the section 11 claims against the individual
defendants sounded in fraud, the court held that they were subject
to the heightened pleading requirements of rule 9(b).30  The court
then held that the plaintiffs’ section 11 claims failed to meet that
standard and dismissed the section 11 claims.31
As to the section 11 and section 12(a)(2) claims against the
underwriters, the district court found them to be claims of negli-
gence, rather than fraud.  Therefore, rule 9(b) was not applicable.
Nonetheless, these claims were dismissed because any optimistic re-
marks attributable to the underwriters were protected by the “be-
speaks caution” doctrine and the safe harbor provision of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”).32  In
addition, there was no showing that the underwriters knew, or
should have known, of any facts that would make their statements
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Rombach, 355 F.3d at 169.
27. Rombach v. Chang, 2002 WL 1396986, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 7, 2002).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at *13.
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or omissions false or misleading when made.33  The plaintiffs
appealed.
At issue on appeal was whether the heightened pleading re-
quirement of rule 9(b) should be applied to claims brought under
section 11 and section 12(a)(2).34  The Second Circuit held that
rule 9(b) applies to section 11 and section 12(a)(2) claims insofar
as the claims are premised on allegations of fraud.35  This holding is
consistent with the majority of other circuits that have ruled on the
issue.36  Only the Eighth Circuit has held rule 9(b) inapplicable to
claims under section 11 of the Securities Act even when the com-
plaint sounds in fraud.37
III. DISCUSSION
The Second Circuit held that rule 9(b) was applicable to claims
that sound in fraud despite acknowledging that “[f]raud is not an
element or a requisite to a claim under section 11 or section
12(a)(2)” and that “a plaintiff need allege no more than negligence
to proceed under section 11 and section 12(a)(2) . . . .”38  Instead
of focusing on the plain language of sections 11 and 12 of the Se-
curities Act, the court based its decision on other considerations.
For example, the court stated that because “[f]raud allegations may
damage a defendant’s reputation,” rule 9(b) served to “safeguard a
defendant’s reputation from improvident charges of wrongdo-
ing.”39  Also, rule 9(b) “prohibit[s] plaintiffs from unilaterally im-
posing upon the court, the parties, and society enormous social and
economic costs absent some factual basis.”40
33. Rombach, 2002 WL 1396986, at *14.
34. Rombach, 355 F.3d at 167. For the purposes of this Comment, I will limit my
discussion to section 11.  For a discussion on whether rule 9(b) should apply to section
12(a)(2) and available defenses to claims under this section, see generally THOMAS LEE
HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 341–401 (4th ed. 2002) (analyzing both
liability provisions and pointing out similarities and differences between liability under
section 11 and section 12(a)(2)).
35. Id. at 171 (stating that although “a plaintiff need allege no more than negli-
gence . . . claims that do rely on averments of fraud are subject to the test of Rule
9(b)”).
36. See supra note 8 (citing cases).
37. In re NationsMart Corp. Sec. Litig., 130 F.3d 309, 314 (8th Cir. 1997).
38. Rombach, 355 F.3d at 171.
39. Id. (citations omitted).
40. Id. (citation omitted).
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While these are important policy concerns, holding that claims
under section 11 of the Securities Act must meet the heightened
pleading requirements of rule 9(b) is inconsistent with the plain
language of section 11 and the general purpose of the Securities
Act.  As will be discussed below, protection of the investing public
was the primary goal of the Securities Act, whereas the protection
of potential defendants was not a key concern.  To ensure compli-
ance with the Act, Congress purposely created liability sections that
made it easy for investors to bring a claim under the Act.  In addi-
tion, imposing a heightened pleading requirement is inconsistent
with rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Finally, sec-
tion 11 already contains sufficient procedural requirements and de-
fenses that offer ample protection from liability under section 11.
Thus, the concerns expressed by the Second Circuit in Rombach
should not override the language and the intent of section 11.
A. The Heightened Pleading Requirement of Rule 9(b) is
Inconsistent with the Plain Language of Section 11 and
Congressional Intent
Neither the plain language of the statute nor the intention of
Congress indicates any requirement that a plaintiff prove fraud to
recover on a section 11 claim.  The Supreme Court has stated that
“[w]here . . . resolution of a question of federal law turns on a stat-
ute and the intention of Congress, we look first to the statutory lan-
guage and then to the legislative history if the statutory language is
unclear.”41  Here, neither the language of section 11 nor the intent
of Congress is unclear.
To make out a prima facie claim under section 11, a plaintiff
need only show that he purchased the security and that the registra-
tion statement contained a material misstatement of fact or an
omission of a material fact.42  There is no requirement in the stat-
ute that a plaintiff prove scienter, or the intent to defraud or
deceive, to succeed on a section 11 claim.43  Also absent from the
41. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 77k. See also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382
(1983) (“If a plaintiff purchased a security pursuant to a registration statement, he need
only show a material misstatement or omission to establish his prima facie case.”).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 77k. See also Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 382 (discussing the
differences between a claim under section 11 and one under section 10(b) of the Ex-
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language of section 11 is the requirement that a plaintiff prove he
relied on the misstatement or omission when making the decision
to buy the security and that such reliance actually caused him to
buy.44  Requiring proof of loss causation is also absent from the stat-
ute.  In fact, the burden is on the defendant to prove, as an affirma-
tive defense if he so chooses, that the plaintiff’s loss was caused by
something other than the misstatement or omission.45  Fraud, by its
very definition, requires intent, reliance, and causation.46  By not
requiring proof of these necessary elements of fraud, section 11 is
not an anti-fraud statute.  By eliminating the requirement of prov-
ing fraud, the Securities Act gave investors additional protections
and made recovery in securities claims easier.47
The intent of Congress is also clear.  Congress enacted the Se-
curities Act and the Exchange Act of 1934 in response to the col-
change Act, the court stated: “[A] section 10(b) plaintiff carries a heavier burden than a
section 11 plaintiff.  Most significantly, he must prove that the defendant acted with
scienter, i.e., with intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud.”); In re NationsMart Corp.,
130 F.3d at 315 (holding that “[s]cienter is not required for establishing liability under
[section 11]”).
44. William O. Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43
YALE. L. J. 171, 174 (1933) (“In the second place the Act requires no proof of reliance
by plaintiff on the untruth or omission.  Neither the plaintiff nor anyone else need to
have known of it.”).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e).  When stating how damages are computed, the statute
continues “[p]rovided, [t]hat if the defendant proves that any portion or all of such dam-
ages represents other than the depreciation in value of such security resulting from
such part of the registration statement, with respect to which liability is asserted . . .
such portion of or all such damages shall not be recoverable.” Id.
46. Fraud is defined as “a knowing misrepresentation of the truth (intent) or con-
cealment of a material fact to induce another (reliance) to act to his or her detriment
(loss causation).” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 670 (7th ed. 1999). See also Bastian v. Pe-
tren, 892 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that a plaintiff alleging a violation of section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act must prove that the alleged fraud actually
caused the loss to the plaintiff).  In its discussion, the court stated that “what securities
lawyers call ‘loss causation’ is the standard common law fraud rule, merely borrowed for
use in federal securities fraud cases.” Id. at 683.
47. “Nevertheless it is true that [section 11] gives to investors additional protec-
tion long needed.  Satisfaction of the common law requirements of fraud raised almost
insurmountable barriers to recovery.  The road of investors has not been an easy one
owing to the common law insistence on scienter, reliance, and causation.”  Douglas &
Bates, supra note 44, at 174.
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lapse of the financial markets in 1929.48  One of the major purposes
of these new laws was to protect investors by encouraging the disclo-
sure of accurate information by the issuer of securities to the invest-
ing public.49  In the context of the Securities Act, which governs the
issuance of new securities into the market, the protections are espe-
cially important.  To encourage compliance with the Securities Act,
“Congress made it easy for buyers to bring a claim under section
11.”50  The liabilities were “set high to guarantee the risk of their
invocation will be effective in assuring that ‘the truth about securi-
ties’ will be told.”51
Requiring a plaintiff to plead with particularity the circum-
stances that constitute fraud adds an additional burden upon the
plaintiff that was not intended by Congress and that is clearly con-
trary to the language of section 11.  “In each instance that Congress
created express civil liability in favor of purchasers or sellers of se-
curities it clearly specified whether recovery was to be premised on
knowing or intentional conduct, negligence, or entirely innocent
mistake.”52  Section 11, however, does not contain any language re-
quiring proof of knowing or intentional conduct, and “[w]ithin the
limits specified in [section] 11(e), the issuer of the securities is held
absolutely liable” for damages resulting from misstatements or
omissions contained in the registration statement that cause losses
to purchasers.53  The statute clearly places the burden on the defen-
48. Billions of dollars worth of securities were brought to market in the 1920s, of
which more than half had become completely worthless by 1933. J. Hicks, CIVIL LIABILI-
TIES: ENFORCEMENT LITIGATION UNDER THE 1933 ACT § 4.01[1], 4-6 (1994).
49. President Roosevelt said that Congress was putting the “burden of telling the
whole truth on the seller” in order to “give impetus to honest dealing in securities and
thereby bring back public confidence.”  Brian Murray & Donald J. Wallace, You
Shouldn’t be Required to Plead More than you Have to Prove, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 783, 784
(2001), citing 77 Cong. Rec. 937 (1933).
50. Krista L. Turnquist, Note, Pleading Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933,
98 MICH. L. REV. 2395, 2401 (2000). See also Douglas & Bates, supra note 44, at 173
(“The civil liabilities imposed by the Act are not only compensatory in nature but also in
terrorem.”).
51. Id.  See also Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 381-82 (“[Section 11] was designed
to assure compliance with the disclosure provisions of the Act by imposing a stringent
standard of liability on the parties who play a direct role in a registered offering.”).
52. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 207 (1976).
53. Id.  at 208 (stating that “section 11 of the 1933 Act unambiguously creates a
private action for damages when a registration statement includes untrue statements of
material facts or fails to state material facts. . . .”). See also Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S.
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dant to prove that the plaintiff knew of the misstatement or omis-
sion at the time the plaintiff acquired the stock.54  Congress
expressly intended the burden to be on the defendants, stating that
for the statute to have any meaning, “it is necessary to throw the
burden of disproving responsibility for reprehensible acts of omis-
sion or commission on those who purport to issue statements for
the public’s reliance.”55
It is clear then that section 11 was not intended to, nor does it,
predicate liability on a showing of fraud.  Accordingly, a plaintiff
should not be required to satisfy the heightened pleading require-
ments of rule 9(b), even when his or her section 11 claim “sound[s]
in fraud.”  A section 11 claim will usually sound in fraud when the
plaintiff pleads claims under the Securities Act and the Exchange
Act in one complaint and incorporates by reference all factual alle-
gations pleaded for one claim into the other claims.56  Claims pur-
suant to section 10b(b) and rule 10b-5 under the Exchange Act are
predicated on fraud,57 and the pleading requirement for those
claims must meet the heightened standard of rule 9(b) and of the
at 382 (“Liability against the issuer of a security is virtually absolute, even for innocent
misstatements.”).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).  The statute states, in pertinent part, “any person acquir-
ing such security (unless it is proved that at the time of such acquisition he knew of
such untruth or omission) may, either in law or in equity, in any court of competent
jurisdiction, sue—.” Id.
55. MATHEW BENDER, FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 § 9.02[12][a], citing H.R.
Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1933).
56. This was the case in Rombach. See Rombach, 355 F.3d at 168-69 (listing the five
different claims pleaded by the plaintiffs, including claims under section 11 and section
12(a) of the Securities Act, and under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 of the Exchange
Act). See also Shapiro, 964 F.2d at 287 (“[The section 11 and section 12 claims] incorpo-
rate by reference all preceding factual allegations, including those delineating defen-
dant’s ‘intent’.”).  It is possible to plead both Securities Act and Exchange Act claims
because, as the Supreme Court held, claims under section 11 and under section 10(b)
are separate causes of action to address different kinds of wrongdoing. Herman &
MacLean, 459 U.S. at 381-84 (discussing the difference between the two sections,
namely that section 10(b) addresses fraudulent conduct while section 11 does not).
57. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000) (stating in pertinent part that “[i]t shall be un-
lawful . . . [t]o use or employ . . . any manipulative or deceptive device. . . .”);  17 C.F.R
§ 240.10b-5 (2005), promulgated under section 10(b) (holding it unlawful to
“(a). . .employ any devise, scheme, or artifice to defraud . . . (c) To engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates . . . as fraud or deceit . . .”). See also
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 207 (holding that scienter is a requirement for claims under
section10(b) and rule10b-5).
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PSLRA.58  Incorporating multiple claims into a single complaint is
encouraged because it conserves judicial resources.59  Thus, to
avoid rule 9(b) requirements in a section 11 claim, a plaintiff would
need to allege that the defendants acted fraudulently in one part of
the complaint, but allege that the defendants did not act fraudu-
lently in another.60  Of course, a plaintiff could separate the factual
allegations of fraud from the factual allegations used to plead a sec-
tion 11 claim.  Some courts have also held that a plaintiff can avoid
pleading fraud for a Securities Act claim by expressly disavowing
any allegations of fraud when incorporating factual allegations.61
Such end result, however, should be avoided.
B. Applying Rule 9(b) to Section 11 Claims is Inconsistent with
the Liberal Pleading Requirements Of Rule 8(a)
In a pleading setting forth a claim for relief, rule 8(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires only “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to re-
lief.”62  The purpose of this rule is to give the defendant “fair notice
of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the ground upon which it
rests.”63  In Leatherman v. Tarrant County, the Supreme Court re-
versed the Fifth Circuit’s requirement that plaintiffs bringing Sec-
58. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B) (1998).  The PSLRA requires that a plaintiff spec-
ify in the complaint “each statement alleged to have been misleading, [and] the reason
or reasons why the statement is misleading. . . .”  In addition, much like rule 9(b), a
plaintiff must “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind.” Id. at § 78u-4(b)(1)-(2).
59. Murray & Wallace, supra note 49, at 789.
60. Id.  Although, such alternative pleadings are expressly permitted by the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e)(2).
61. In re NationsMart, 130 F.3d at 315 (refusing to apply rule 9(b) even though the
complaint alleged both Securities Act and Exchange Act claims because the complaint
“expressly disavow[ed] any claim of fraud in connection with the § 11 and § 12(2)
counts”). See also In re Number Nine Visual Tech. Corp. Sec. Lit., 51 F. Supp. 2d 1,12-25
(D. Mass. 1999) (approving the use of a disclaimer in the section 11 claim that dis-
avowed all allegations of fraud in the section 11 complaint). But see In re Ultrafem Inc.
Sec. Lit., 91 F. Supp. 2d at 690-91 (refusing to hold that a disclaimer incorporating all
factual allegations “except to the extent they . . . sound in fraud” disavowed the fraud
allegations).
62. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
63. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (citation omitted).
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tion 1983 claims must meet a heightened pleading requirement.64
The Court held that “it is impossible to square the ‘heightened
pleading standard’ applied by the Fifth Circuit . . . with the liberal
system of ‘notice pleading’ set up by the Federal Rules.”65
The Court recognized that rule 9(b) addresses the need for
greater particularity in pleading certain actions, specifically “in all
averments of fraud or mistake.”66  However, as stated above, section
11 is not an anti-fraud statute and “proof of fraud or mistake is not
a prerequisite to establishing liability under section 11.”67  Even if a
plaintiff alleges fraud in a section 11 claim, “any such allegation
would be mere surplusage.”68  “The only consequence of a holding
that rule 9(b) is violated with respect to a section 11 claim would be
that any allegations of fraud would be stripped from the claim.  The
allegations of innocent or negligent conduct, which are at the heart
of a section 11 claim, would survive.”69
In addition, a primary purpose of rule 9(b)’s particularity re-
quirement is to “apprise a defendant of the claim against him and
of the acts relied upon as constituting the fraud charged.”70  How-
ever, a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case under section 11 sim-
ply by showing that he or she bought the security and that the
registration statement contained a material misstatement or omis-
sion of fact.71  Thus, once a plaintiff alleges that he bought the se-
curity and that the registration statement contained a material
misstatement or omission, he has satisfied rule 8(a) and given the
defendant “fair notice of what [his] claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.”72  Further, no single individual defendant needs to
be put on notice of a particular statement because a registration
64. Id. at 164.
65. Id. at 168.
66. Id., citing FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (alteration omitted).
67. In re NationsMart, 130 F.3d at 314.
68. Id. at 315.
69. Id. See also Lone Star Ladies Inv. Club v. Schlotzky’s, 238 F.3d 363, 368 (5th
Cir. 2001) (“Where averments of fraud are made in a claim in which fraud is not an
element, an inadequate averment of fraud does not mean that no claim has been
stated.  The proper route is to disregard averments of fraud not meeting rule 9(b)’s
standard and then ask whether a claim has been stated.”).
70. Felton v. Walston & Co., 508 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1974), citing 5 C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1297, 404 (1969).
71. Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 382.
72. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168 (citation omitted).
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statement is a collective work, and every person named in a section
11 claim is liable for any misstatement in the registration state-
ment.73  Therefore, requiring a heightened pleading standard for
section 11 claims cannot be squared with the “liberal system of no-
tice pleading set up by the Federal Rules.”74
C. Procedural Safeguards of Section 11 and Available Affirmative
Defenses Warrant Sufficient Protection for Defendants from
Frivolous Claims
A plaintiff must meet the numerous procedural requirements
of section 11 before proceeding with a section 11 claim.  First, a
plaintiff must have standing to bring a section 11 claim.  To have
standing, the plaintiff must trace the purchased securities to the
registration statement containing the alleged misstatements or
omissions.75  This task should be relatively rudimentary if the pur-
chaser acquired the securities in the initial offering or if the issuing
company has undertaken one stock offering only.  The task how-
ever may become thorny in a situation where the purchaser ac-
quired the security in the secondary markets, especially when the
issuing corporation has made more than one registered offering
and not every registration statement is defective.  Next, the alleged
misstatement or omission must be present at the time the registra-
tion statement becomes effective.76  A registration statement that
73. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(1)-(5). See also Murray & Wallace, supra note 49, at 800
(“The prospectus is a group effort . . . It is impossible for an outsider to identify who is
responsible for a particular statement in a prospectus.”).
74. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168 (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. See Demaria v. Anderson, 318 F.3d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[The] under-
standing of the statutory text conforms with the long-standing practice in this circuit of
permitting suit under § 11 by those who can ‘trace’ their shares to the allegedly defec-
tive registration statement.”). See also Lee v. Ernst & Young, 294 F.3d 969, 978 (8th Cir.
2002) (holding that a plaintiff will have standing to sue under section 11 by making a
prima facie showing that the stock he or she purchased “can be traced to the registra-
tion statement alleged to be false and misleading”).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (stating that a purchaser of securities may sue if “any part
of the registration statement, when such part became effective, contained an untrue
statement of material fact or omitted to state a material fact . . .”).
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-2\NLR216.txt unknown Seq: 13 21-MAR-05 12:45
2004] ROMBACH V. CHANG 821
becomes misleading due to events that occur after the effective date
does not provide a basis for liability.77
The plaintiff must also commence his action within the statute
of limitations.78  Actual knowledge of the misleading statements or
omissions is not required, and the statute will begin to run even if
the plaintiff was put on “inquiry notice” of the section 11 viola-
tions.79  The standard of inquiry notice is an objective one, and the
question is whether there was enough information so that a person
of ordinary intelligence would have investigated further.80  Compli-
ance with the statute of limitations is a pleading requirement for
section 11 claims and not an affirmative defense.81  Finally, a plain-
tiff may also be required to post a bond for costs, including reasona-
ble attorney’s fees and expenses, incurred in defense of a suit later
found to be without merit.82
These requirements, which are built into the statute, alleviate
the fear that plaintiffs would bypass the pleading requirements of
rule (9)(b) and the PSLRA by bringing their securities fraud claims
77. BENDER, supra note 55, at § 9.02[6][c] (“Section 11 provides no liability unless
the misrepresentations and omissions were present when the registration statement be-
came effective.”).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1978).  The statute states, in pertinent part, “No action shall
be maintained to enforce any liability created under section 11 or section 12(a)(2)
unless brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or the omis-
sion, or after such discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence . . . In no event shall any such action be brought . . . more than three years after
the security was bona fide offered to the public . . . .”
79. Cantor Fitzgerald, Inc. v. Lutnick, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 999, at *6 (2002)
(“Under federal law, to be placed on inquiry notice, ‘a plaintiff need not be aware of all
aspects of the alleged fraud . . . Rather, a plaintiff is on inquiry notice at the time at
which the plaintiff should have discovered the general fraudulent scheme,’” citing In re
Merrill Lynch Ltd. P’shps Litig., 7 F. Supp. 2d 256, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
80. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 1983) (“Where the circum-
stances are such as to suggest to a person of ordinary intelligence the probability that
he has been defrauded, a duty of inquiry arises, and if he omits that inquiry when it
would have developed the truth, and shuts his eyes to the facts which call for investiga-
tion, knowledge of the fraud will be imputed to him.” citing Higgins v. Crouse, 147 N.Y.
411, 416 (1895)).
81. In re Complete Mgmt. Sec. Litig., 153 F. Supp. 2d 314, 335 n.15 (2001).
82. 17 U.S.C. § 77k(e). See also Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 209-10 (“Section 11(e) of
the 1933 Act, for example, authorizes the court to require a plaintiff bringing a suit
under section 11. . . to post a bond for costs, including attorney’s fees, and in specified
circumstances to assess costs at the conclusion of the litigation.”).
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under section 11, rather than under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 of
the Exchange Act.  Claims under section 11, unlike claims under
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, may only be brought in limited cir-
cumstances.  As just stated, liability under section 11 occurs only
when the misstatements and omissions are contained in a registra-
tion statement and only at the time the registration statement be-
came effective.83  In contrast, a claim can be brought under section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 for any misstatement or omission made by
anyone with authority to speak for a public corporation, at any
time, in any medium.84  Rule 10b-5 liability has been extended to
cover a number of situations, including traditional insider trading
transactions,85 insider trading based on the “misappropriation” the-
ory,86  and “tipper” liability.87  In addition, a plaintiff pleading a
claim under rule 10b-5 has the burden of proving loss causation,
unlike claims under section 11.88  Therefore, the heightened plead-
ing requirements are necessary for section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 to
protect defendants and to prevent an overflow of frivolous lawsuits.
Such added protection is not necessary for section 11 defendants.
83. The title to section 11 is “Civil Liabilities on Account of False Registration
Statement.”  15 U.S.C. § 77(k); see supra note 76 and accompanying text.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). See also Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 382 (“§ 10(b) is a
‘catchall’ antifraud provision.”).  While a section 11 action must be brought by a pur-
chaser of a registered security, must be based on misstatements or omissions in a regis-
tration statement, and can only be brought against certain parties, a section 10(b)
action can be brought by a purchaser or seller of “any security” against “any person”
who has used “any manipulative or deceptive devise or contrivance.” Id., citing 15
U.S.C. § 78j (emphasis added by the Court).
85. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding
that rule 10b-5 applied to the stock transactions made by various corporate insiders who
were in possession of material, non-public information); United States v. O’Hagan, 521
U.S. 642, (1997) (stating that “[u]nder the ‘traditional’ or ‘classical theory’ of insider
trading liability, section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 are violated when a corporate insider
trades in the securities of his corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic
information.”).
86. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (approving the misappropriation theory as a basis
for liability under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5).  Under this theory, a non-corporate
insider commits fraud “when he misappropriates confidential information for securities
trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information.” Id. at
652.  Unlike a corporate insider who violates his duties of trust to the shareholders of
the corporation for which he works, liability is premised on “a fiduciary-turned-trader’s
deception of those who entrusted him with access to confidential information.” Id.
87. Id.
88. See Bastian, 892 F.2d 680; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, a defendant in a section 11 suit also has a num-
ber of affirmative defenses available to defend against a section 11
claim.  As noted above, a plaintiff must not have known about the
alleged misstatement or omission at the time the plaintiff pur-
chased the securities.89 Accordingly, if a defendant can prove that
the plaintiff in fact knew of the misstatement or omission, the de-
fendant may avoid liability.  In addition, a defendant may reduce or
even entirely eliminate liability if the defendant can prove that
something other than the misstatement or omission, outside mar-
ket forces for instance, caused the decline in the security’s value.90
The so-called due diligence defense is probably the most signif-
icant defense available to a section 11 defendant.91  Each individual
defendant92 can avoid liability by demonstrating that, after a rea-
sonable investigation, he or she had reasonable grounds to believe,
and did believe, that at the time the registration statement became
effective the statements contained therein were true and without
omission of any material facts.93  When determining what consti-
tutes a reasonable investigation, the “standard of reasonableness is
that of a prudent man in the management of his own property.”94
This general due diligence defense applies only to portions of
the registration statement “not purporting to be made on the au-
thority of an expert.”95  Section 11 distinguishes between portions
of the registration statement that were made under the authority of
89. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e); see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
91. See Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 682-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
which is the “leading section 11 decision.” BENDER, supra note 55, at § 9.02[12][d].
92. The issuer itself cannot exercise due diligence and thus does not have a due
diligence defense.  15 U.S.C. § 77k(b).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3). See also Barchris, 283 F. Supp. at 683-97.  The court sets
forth the due diligence defense and goes on to discuss whether each individual defen-
dant met his burden to show that he did in fact make some investigation into whether
the registration statement was accurate.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c).  To help clarify what constitutes a reasonable investigation,
the SEC enacted rule 176 of the Securities Act.  Rule 176 provides a non-exclusive list of
circumstances that should be considered when determining whether there was a rea-
sonable investigation.  17 C.F.R. § 230.176.  Still, what constitutes a reasonable investiga-
tion is not entirely clear, but what is apparent is that more investigation is required
when a defendant is in a higher position and was closely involved in the preparation of
the registration statement.  In addition, merely reading the registration statement or
asking questions is not enough. Barchris, 283 F. Supp. at 683-97.
95. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A).
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an expert,96 or the “expertised” portions,97 and those that were not.
As to those expertised portions of the registration statement, a non-
expert defendant is not required to do any reasonable investiga-
tion.  All the non-expert must demonstrate is that he or she simply
“had no reasonable ground to believe, and did not believe . . . that
the statements therein were untrue or that there was an omission to
state a material fact . . . .”98  The expert who prepared those exper-
tised portions of the registration statement can only be held liable
for the parts he prepared.99  The same due diligence defense is
available to the expert with respect to those expertised parts.100  In
determining whether such an expert engaged in a reasonable inves-
96. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(B) (stating, “as regards to any part of the registration
statement purporting to be made upon his authority as an expert or purporting to be a
copy of or extract from a report or valuation of himself as an expert. . . .”)  (emphasis
added).  “Typically, this includes only the certified financial statements.” BENDER, supra
note 55 , at § 9.02[12][d].  An expert is “any person whose profession gives authority to
a statement made by him, who has with his consent been named as having prepared or
certified any report or valuation which is used in connection with the registration state-
ment. . . .”  15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4).
97. See Barchris, 283 F. Supp. at 683 (calling, for convenience, the parts of the
registration statement made on the authority of an expert the ‘expertised portion’).
The court rejected the view that the entire registration was expertised merely because
the lawyers for both the company and the underwriters were responsible for drafting
the entire document. Id.  However, it has been held that a legal opinion within a regis-
tration statement drafted by counsel is an expertised part of the statement. See In re
Am. Cont’l Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1424, 1453 (D. Ariz.
1992) (holding that an “attorney who provides a legal opinion used in connection with
an SEC registration statement is an expert within the meaning of Section 11”).
98. Barchris, 283 F. Supp. at 683.
99. See In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 789 F. Supp. 1489, 1510 (N.D.
Cal. 1992) (“Section 11 limits an accountant’s liability to a statement in a registration
statement ‘which purports to have been prepared or certified by him.’  An accountant
may therefore be held liable only for those statements ‘expressly attributed to the ac-
countant’ on the face of the registration statement.”) (citing 15 U.S.C. 77k(a)(4)); Mc-
Farland v. Memorex Corp., 493 F. Supp. 631, 643 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
100. Thus, such expert will not be liable if, with respect to those portions of the
registration statement prepared by him or another similar expert, “he had, after reason-
able investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe. . .that the statements
[in the registration statement] were true and that there was no omission to state a
material fact. . . .”  15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(B)(i). See also Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 208 (“An
expert may avoid civil liability with respect to the portions of the registration statement
for which he was responsible by showing that ‘after reasonable investigation’ he had
‘reasonable ground[s] to believe’ that the statements for which he was responsible were
true and there was no omission of a material fact,” citing Barchris, 283 F. Supp. at 697-
703).
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tigation, the expert “should not be held to a standard higher that
that recognized in their profession.”101
Even if a defendant cannot rely on these affirmative defenses,
the defendant can still seek to rely on the Securities Act’s protec-
tion of certain forward looking statements.  The first of these safe-
harbor provisions for forward-looking statements is section 27A.102
This section is the statutory codification of the “bespeaks caution”
doctrine, created by the courts to protect defendants from state-
ments that should bespeak caution upon a purchaser.103  Under
this section, any statement deemed to be “forward-looking” cannot
be used by a plaintiff as the basis of liability for any suit under the
Securities Act, not just section 11.104  The safe-harbor applies to
statements made by an issuer who is “subject to the reporting re-
quirements of section 13(a) or section 15(d) of the Securities Ex-
101. Barchris, 283 F. Supp. at 703.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (1998).  Section 27A was added to the Securities Act as part
of the PSLRA,  Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995). See BENDER, supra note 55, at
§ 9.02[6][b].
A forward looking statement is defined to include, in relevant part:
. . . .
(A) a statement containing a projection of revenues, income (including
income loss), earnings (including earnings loss) per share, capital ex-
penditures, dividends, capital structure, or other financial items;
(B) a statement of the plans and objectives of management for future oper-
ations, including plans or objectives relating to the products or services
of the issuer;
(C) a statement of future economic performance . . . ;
(D) any statement of the assumptions underlying or relating to any state-
ment described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C); . . .
Id. at § 77z-2(h)(I)(1).
103. See BENDER, supra note 55, at § 9.02[12][d] (discussing the enactment of the
PSLRA and the bespeaks caution doctrine.  It states that “[t]he safe harbor applies . . .
as long as . . . (1) the statement is identified as a forward-looking statement and is
accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements, thereby codifying the ‘bespeaks caution’
doctrine. . . .”) (emphasis added); In re Donald Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 793 F. Supp.
543 (D.N.J. 1992), aff’d 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing the bespeaks caution
doctrine).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(1) (stating in pertinent part that “in any private action
arising under this title that is based on an untrue statement of a material fact or omis-
sion of a material fact necessary to make the statement not misleading, a person re-
ferred to in subsection (a) shall not be liable with respect to any forward-looking statement
. . . .”) (emphasis added).
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change Act of 1934.”105  In addition, the statement must be labeled
as a forward-looking statement and must be accompanied by
“meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors
that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the
forward-looking statement. . . .”106  Similarly, the SEC has adopted
rule 175 of the Securities Act, which protects certain forward-look-
ing statements from being deemed fraudulent.107  The definition of
a forward-looking statement under this rule is fairly close to the def-
inition of a forward-looking statement under section 27A.108  There
are, however, a few significant differences between section 27A and
rule 175.  First, section 27A covers any statement made by one of
the specified people, whether written or oral, while rule 175 covers
only written statements contained in documents actually filed with
the SEC.109  Second, rule 175 does not require that the statement
105. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(a)(1).  Sections 13(a) and 15(d) of the Exchange Act, if ap-
plicable to a company, requires the company to file quarterly and annual reports about
the financial health and performance of the company during the previous period with
the SEC.  They also require the company to file periodic reports to keep public infor-
mation about the company current.  The section also applies to “a person acting on
behalf of such an issuer; an outside reviewer retained by such issuer making a statement
on behalf of such issuer; or an underwriter . . .” Id. at § 77z-2(a)(2)-(4).
106. Id. at § 77z-2(c)(1)(A)(i). See also In re Donald Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 793 F.
Supp. at 371-72 (stating that “a vague or blanket (boilerplate) disclaimer which merely
warns the reader that the investment has risks will ordinarily be inadequate to prevent
misinformation.  To suffice, the cautionary statements must be substantive and tailored
to the specific future projections, estimates or opinions in the prospectus which the
plaintiffs challenge.”).  Even if the statement is not labeled accordingly and accompa-
nied by the cautionary language, the statement will not be the basis of liability if it is
immaterial. Id. at § 77z-2(c)(1)(A)(ii).
107. 17 C.F.R. § 230.175(a) (2005).  As defined in this rule, a “fraudulent state-
ment” encompasses any statement “which is an untrue statement of a material fact, a
statement false or misleading with respect to any material fact, an omission to state a
material fact necessary to make a statement not misleading, or which constitutes the
employment of a manipulative, deceptive, or fraudulent devise, contrivance, scheme,
transaction, act practice, course of business, or an artifice to defraud. . . .” Id. at
§ 230.175(d) (emphasis added).  It is clear that a “fraudulent statement” under this rule
includes a statement that is false or misleading, even though made without the intent to
defraud. See NationsMart, 130 F.3d at 316 (“‘Fraudulent’ for purposes of Rule 175 does
not mean fraud in the traditional sense, but instead simply denotes any of the bases of
liability under the Securities Act, including liability under § 11.”); Wielgos v. Common-
wealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 513 (7th Cir. 1989) (“‘[F]raudulent statement’ in Rule
175(a) turns out to be shorthand for all of the bases of liability in the ‘33 Act and its
implementing rules.”).
108. Id. at § 230.175(c).
109. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 with 17 C.F.R. § 230.175.
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be labeled or accompanied by cautionary language.  It only requires
that the statement be made in good faith and with a reasonable
basis.110
In Rombach, the court unambiguously stated that the plaintiffs’
allegations were “undercut” because the registration statement
“contained sufficient cautionary language to bespeak caution and
trigger the safe harbor provision of the PSLRA.”111  Thus, the court
stated that even if the section 11 claims did not sound in fraud and
were pleaded in negligence, they “would be defeated in any event
by the bespeaks caution doctrine . . . .”112
IV. CONCLUSION
Taking into account the arsenal of the stringent procedural re-
quirements and the available affirmative defenses, as well as the
protections afforded to forward-looking statements, it is beyond
question that sufficient protection exists for defendants in a section
11 action.  That section 11 can be used in limited circumstances is
another factor weighing against requiring plaintiffs bringing suit
under section 11 to meet the heightened pleading standards of rule
9(b).  In addition, this heightened pleading requirement is con-
trary to the plain language of section 11, Congressional intent be-
hind the Securities Act, and the liberal pleading requirements of
Rule 8(a).  Therefore, the Second Circuit’s Rombach decision misses
the mark.
110. 17 C.F.R. § 230.175(a).
111. Rombach, 355 F.3d at 175.  The court referred to the district court’s finding
that the registration statement and prospectus contained sufficient cautionary language
and information about the financial risks.  For example, the offering documents stated
“that some Family Golf facilities had ‘experienced losses’ and that “‘no assurance’
could be given that additional facilities would be ‘readily integrated into the Company’s
operating structure.’” Id.
112. Id. at 176.
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